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12 Feb 2007  ***  Published every Monday

The Election Fraud News Weekly Collection
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Michael Collins

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Weekly Comment:

Blogger and DUer FogerRox has a chate with Congressman Rush Holt, D, NJ on the most important voting legislation before congress.  Reproduced with permission.

 

Rush Holt introduces replacement to HR 550, HR 811 
(Link to JerseyBlue Blog)

by: FogerRox

Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 00:13:51 AM EST

(This is important legislation and the author of this posting is knowledgeable on the subject. This is the third incarnation of this bill, which was not able to get out of committee in its two previous incarnations because of the makeup of the House, not because of the need for legislation. - promoted by DBK)

Already brewing a firestorm in the election reform cummunity, HR 811 is called the "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007". Introduced on Febuary 5th, HR 811 was posted @ Thomas earlier today, but preceding the posting @ Thomas were numerous scathing reviews. But the news is not all bad. HR 811 does not allow a voting system to have any WiFi:
No voting system shall contain, use, or be accessible by any wireless, power-line, remote, wide area, or concealed communication device at all.
 
The Diebold TSX touchscreen is available with a wireless option.

HR 811 does not allow a voting device to be connected to the net.

No component of any voting device upon which votes are cast shall be connected to the Internet at any time.
 
More below the fold:
FogerRox :: Rush Holt introduces replacement to HR 550, ... HR 811
That makes the ES&S iVotronic touchscreen voting machine illegal, the iVotronic must be connected to the mainframe via the net for it to even work.

The rights of a voter are protected if equipment breaks down and emergency ballots are used:

Any emergency paper ballot which is cast by an individual under this subparagraph shall be counted and otherwise treated as a regular ballot...

And Holt does deal with Proprietary Source code:

PROHIBITION OF USE OF UNDISCLOSED SOFTWARE IN VOTING SYSTEMS

But there is more to HR 811 that that. Some of it does not exactly thrill me.

First off a letter from  Ron Baiman:.
 

. A) I'm not sure if you're aware of the fact that much of the clearly documented large scale corruption in 2004 in Ohio occurred on optical-scan paper ballot systems.
.
Remember that Harry Hursti hacked a Diebold optical scanner in Volusa county FLorida last year. It would seem if you want a Voter Verified Paper Ballot printer on your touchscreen voting machine, you wold want the same on an opscan. Since both are vulnerable to hacks, both should have the same protection. Holts HR 811 has a specific opscanner exemption, no audit of paper:
.
SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT.
(a)(1)(A)`(i) The voting system shall require the use of or produce an individual voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted. For purposes of this clause, examples of such a ballot include a paper ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being counted by hand or read by an optical scanner...

Dr. Baiman continues:

. This is not to say that this did not occur on ETS or "punch card" systems (still in use then), but the point is that optical scan machine miscounts and rigged or biased "recount" corruption are an evident and real danger to a trustworthy voting system - see: http://www.freepress...

B) The corrupted precents were targeted for detailed on-the-ground poll book, absentee, early, and provisional, vote investigation, by analyzing statistical anomalies in vote returns, not because races were close in these counties. Exit poll evidence (Ohio was the only state where precinct level exit poll data and matching election results were released, after this data was used to ostensibly rule out fraud!) was also key to alerting analysts to potential vote corruption in 2004. ( see
video of We Count Presentation at: http://www.wecount20... / and http://www.freepress... )

C) These facts point to a need for regular uncorrupted and objective recounts and audits of sufficient quality and power to ensure corruption detection (even with op-scan machines and paper ballots) and for public (or at least publicly transparent and available) exit polling data and detailed precinct-level analysis of election return data (that needs to be available to the candidates and to the public before results are certified) regardless of the closeness of the election.

D) They also raise concern about the following reported provision in HOLT 2 (discovered by election integrity attorney Paul Lehto):

"In states with automatic machine recount provisions based on winning percentage, no paper "ballots" will EVER be counted if the race is CLOSE. This provision (if it is in the bill), which seems to suggest that [b]"automatic machine recounts" can replace paper ballot counts (even when the race is close)[/b] defies logic and common sense, and appears to vitiate the entire intent of the bill!

Sincerely,

Ron Baiman, Ph. D.
Center for Urban Research and Learning
Loyola University Chicago

Sorry Rush, an exemption for the touchscreen machine style recount is BS. It must be spelled out that said state do at least a Holt style audit of paper.

Election attorney Paul Lehto: on proprietary source code in HR 811. 

. The Holt bill, while seeming to have a very broad duty on the part of state and local government officials to "disclose" source code and object code (etc) to the federal government, has very weak langage on how the local or state government officials are going to get their paws on all this source code in all jurisdictions in the first place.

Remember Chris Jennings running for House in FLorida? Remember the 18,000 votes that went missing? Lets say FL-13 happens again...I wanna complete post mortem, forget about the open/closed source code. If your equipment does a FL-13, You lose, you do not pass go, you do not collect $200. I use any tool at my disposal to open those suckers up. At that point the vendor has like.... NO Effin Proprietary RIGHTS, as to their source code. Thats the law I want.

Positive summary:
~no WiFi.
~no Internet connections.
~Emergency ballots get counted like normal.

Negative Summary:
~ No paper trail for opscans.
~ Weak language on source code.
~ No paper audit for a state auto recount, Holt says machine recount is good enough. Remember the machine recount FL-13?

I think Ms. Mulder & Mr. Holt have some more work to do. Though, if thats the best we get, I will likely support this bill, ~sigh~ .

HR 811 can be read in full here.

It is my understanding that the future of Holts new HR 811 is out of his hands, Congresswoman Juanita Millender-McDonald who chairs the Committee on House Administration (CHA) looks like she is control of any future rewrites of
HR 811. And I have been told she is not anti-DRE.

http://cha.house.gov...

Here is her contact page

http://millender-mcd...

Here is more contact info

http://www.visi.com/...

Tags: Rush Holt, HR 811, Election Integrity, (All Tags)
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Rush Holt introduces replacement to HR 550, ... HR 811 | 20 comments | Post A Comment
 
Bev Harris of Black Box Voting (www.blackboxvoting.org) (0.00 / 0)
is very much AGAINST this bill, as is the entire Black Box Voting organization.

Other organizations which have come out publicly AGAINST this bill include: 
  Open Voting Consortium, VoterAction.org/ Demos, Bradblog, VotersUnite,
  VoteTrustUSA

According to Bev Harris, there are too many problems to fix, including deceptive language, unreadability, billion dollar unfunded mandate, conflicting requirements, no recognition of citizen right to oversight, allowing loss of secret ballots for the millitary, and many, many loopholes.

Currently, only two vendors manufacture the needed technology, and one (Populex) has as head of its advisory board Frank Carlucci, the former chairman of the CARLYLE GROUP and former CIA Director, who was Donald Rumsfeld's roomate in college.  Something is wrong with this picture!

Since Bev Harris is the one who STARTED this entire movement, I trust her, and she says that this is a "BAD BILL" which must scrapped.  I believe her, before I believe Rush Holt. Too bad.  Another illusion lost!


by: krose @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 14:14:07 PM EST
[ Reply ]
 
 
Thanks for the promotion Dean. Now on Bev Harris....
I would offer that Andy Stephensons' run for SOS in WA, may have preceded BBV, as well as Lynn Landes work. Lynn did team up with Harris a few years back, as did Andy.

Bev has done some brilliant work, she has also done some very less than brilliant things in the past. Enough said.

Attorney Paul Lehto has sued Sequoia Voting systems in the State of Washington, after the 2004 election in that state. Paul has basically driven Sequoia out of his home state, he also went to CA-50 to help with the Busby Brilby farce. Paul is a fire brand with strong opinions but never fails to make his case wether you agree with him or not.

I think Dr. Baimans credentials speak for themselves.

There are good parts to HR811, there are vague parts (poorly written) & Hr 811 has 2 maybe 3 things that are flat out wrong. I have tried to offer bluejersey a no nonsense, no hyperbole, no BS review that doesn't get bogged down in minutia.

I urge Jerseyians to contact Congresswoman Juanita Millender-McDonald who chairs the Committee on House Administration (CHA) looks like she is in control of any future rewrites of HR 811. And I have been told she is not anti-DRE.

contact info here:
http://millender-mcd...
And here:
http://www.visi.com/...

Impeach, Indict.
 


by: FogerRox @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 15:23:09 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
Additionally, krose, I was not aware that VoteTrust
had come out against HR 811. Have they changed their position?

Impeach, Indict.
 
by: FogerRox @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 21:11:09 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
HR 811 (3.66 / 3)
Thank you for your interest in my Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act.  In order to restore confidence that the American people place in our government and in our electoral system, I have worked since 2003 to require that voting systems be both accessible and verifiable.  Therefore, I would like to clear up some apparent misunderstandings reflected in the most recent post concerning my legislation.

First, the post states that my legislation does not require optical scan machines to produce a voter-verified paper ballot.  In fact, optical scan ballots ARE voter-verified paper ballots.  Indeed, the post even quotes the specific provision of my legislation that says optical scan ballots are included in the list of permissible voter-verified paper ballots.

Secondly, contrary to the assertion of the post, the language in my legislation that prohibits the use of undisclosed software in voting systems is clear, strong, and enforceable.  It explicitly forbids states from using voting systems whose source code has not been disclosed to and certified by the state.  The state must furnish that information to the Election Assistance Commission, which would distribute to any person upon request.

Thirdly, the post states that the legislation would allow a machine recount in the event of an automatically triggered recount.  My legislation explicitly says the opposite: "the individual permanent paper ballots shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast and shall be used as the official ballots for purposes of any recount or audit."  The language to which the post refers simply states that in the event that an automatic recount is triggered under state law, a partial audit need not be done in addition to such recount; indeed, conducting a partial audit and an automatic recount at the same would be chaotic, if not impossible. 

I appreciate BlueJersey's continued interest in this issue.  For four years, I have solicited and incorporated advice from election officials, elected officials, the public, and activists like you to help this legislation achieve its goal of restoring trust to the electoral process.  You may rest assured that if there were any language in the bill that required clarification, I will address it in the ordinary course as the bill moves through the Committee process.  I look forward to working with House Administration Chairwoman Juanita Millender-McDonald, Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and others to pass HR 811 soon.

Sincerely,
RUSH HOLT
 


by: Rush Holt @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 16:13:51 PM EST
[ Reply ]
 
 
thank you for the clarification
I'd add that Section 323, together with the early sections, clearly requires that the paper ballots for the optical scanner are still subject to the manual 'hand count' account.  So there will be a check whether the machine count matches the  hand count of these ballots.  So I don't understand the objection in the original post.

I remember some question last year whether the manual partial audits followed the optimal strategy.  That is, one would like the strategy of selecting areas for hand counts to maximize the chance of detecting fraud, without actually recounting every single ballot. Can anyone comment on that?


 


by: Hopeful @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 17:24:08 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
Section 2 is Germane, it defines a scanned paper ballot as a VVPB
yet it does not reference sections 322 or 323.

Sections 322 & 323 do not contain the words opscan or optical scanner.

http://thomas.loc.go...

http://thomas.loc.go...

My guess is the germane section is #2, I cited section 2, as did Congressman Holt. Section 323 is an administrative section.
Section 322 is the the actual guts of the "Gold Standard" Audit.

If you wished to see Sections 322 & 323 cited in section 2, I would agree with you.

I am not willing to ASSUME paper ballots, scanned, are subject to the "Holt Audit". Spelling this out in one sentence is very to ask.

I would offer that Section 322's audit should be cited in section 2. Then there can be no guessing.

Impeach, Indict.
 


by: FogerRox @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 21:05:56 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
it needs to be clear
It's times like this I'm glad I'm not a lawyer!

 
by: Hopeful @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 21:15:00 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
You cited Section 322 & 322, & said "Clearly"
I'd add that Section 323, together with the early sections, clearly requires that the paper ballots for the optical scanner are still subject to the manual 'hand count'

Thru HR 811 many sections cite another section or other public law. Its quite common in most VVPB state law that I have read, as well as HAVA, & NJ election law title 19.

At this point its not clear (pun intended) what your intent was.

Impeach, Indict.
 


by: FogerRox @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 21:29:47 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
well
I will show below why I thought 'clearly' it includes the optical scanner ballots, but I acknowledge that I am not a lawyer and I may be wrong.  You have certainly thought about this more than I have.  And it does, as you say, refer to other laws. 

Why I think it seems like it does not exclude paper ballots to be counted by optical scanner:

Section 2:

The voting system shall require the use of or produce an individual voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted. For purposes of this clause, examples of such a ballot include a paper ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being counted by hand or read by an optical scanner or other similar device, [other types of ballots]

This seems to me to mean that the paper ballot to be scanned by the optical scanner is a "voter-verified paper ballot"  Indeed, this seems plausible since the voter can look at the ballot and see that the correct candidate is marked.  [A different section addresses disabled voters.]

Then next section says that these ballots will be preserved and 

  `(iii) In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual permanent paper ballots produced pursuant to subparagraph (A), and subject to subparagraph (D), the individual permanent paper ballots shall be the true and correct record of the votes cast and shall be used as the official ballots for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used.

Now on to the hand (manual) recounts.

Section 322:

  In General- Except as provided in subsection (b), the number of voter-verified paper ballots which will be subject to a hand count administered by the Election Audit Board of a State under this subtitle with respect to an election shall be determined as follows:
 

This is the exact language which is used to describe the paper ballots the voter had marked and has been counted by an optical scanner.

Section 323:

`(2) With respect to votes cast at the precinct or equivalent location on or before the date of the election (other than provisional ballots described in paragraph (3)), the Board shall administer the hand count of the votes on the paper voter-verified ballots required to be produced and preserved under section 301(a)(2)(A) and the comparison of the count of the votes on those ballots with the final unofficial count of such votes as announced by the State.

again, this refers to the same language and even points to the very paragraph that said the optical scanner ballots are paper voter-verified ballots.

So to me it seems clear that these ballots will be audited, and I don't see how any other interpretation can be made.  But not being a lawyer, nor prepared to read the numerous other laws, I admit the possibility of being wrong. 

But why do you think these ballots would not be subject to audit?
 


by: Hopeful @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 23:41:02 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
You are cooking with gas now.
And I think that is the answer Holt might give. That is the answer I WANT HOLT TO GIVE. But it is a strech with no or little linking cites. You have a brain, you connected 4 separate data points and made a connection, and say "if these are VVPB's, and VVPB's are audited, then Section 322 must apply. In court, I would hope a judge would see it the same way you do. But its not at all clear.

Former Ohio SOS Ken Blackwell took well meaning vaguely written law and tore the crap out of it, putting Bush back in the White House in 2004.

Hopeful, don't you think that one sentence in Section 2, citing Section 322 is well worth the trouble?

I think so.

Unless you like making 4 sets of block quotes..

/snark

Parts of HR 811 are finely crafted, other parts are vague and teeming with loopholes. I don't get it.

Impeach, Indict.
 


by: FogerRox @ Sat Feb 10, 2007 at 00:41:34 AM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
A little Saturday morning ranting
Some laws are deliberately vague. It makes it look like those in power are actually doing the people's bidding when in fact it's more blowing smoke up our collective asses.
As long as there are republicans willing to support the likes of a Bush Administration by any means necessary, vague language in any law must be eliminated.
Paper ballots deposited in a clear plastic locked box in the middle of the room for public inspection, with the box opened in public at the end of the day and the ballots counted in public by officials from all interested parties, and every voter gets a bright blue thumb upon voting sounds pretty simple to me.
Election day should be election weekend for maximum participation.
A cap should be placed on the money spent for campaigns. Campaign ads should be kept off the broadcast media until three weeks before elections. All broadcast media ads should be limited to two minutes, nothing shorter or longer and must be done by the candidate. No advocacy ads should be permitted.
Anyone caught vandalizing campaign signs shall be publicly horse whipped.
Campaign signs on public property should be illegal and removed by public works employees within 24 hours of notification to the responsible agency. We're tired of the litter on our streets.
Anyone caught trying to rig an election shall be publicly horse whipped, and in the case of Ku Klux Karl Rove, torture.
So much for humor.

Restore democracy and the Constitution for which it stands.
 
by: The Wizard @ Sat Feb 10, 2007 at 08:37:28 AM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
This maybe what you are talking about...
I remember some question last year whether the manual partial audits followed the optimal strategy.  That is, one would like the strategy of selecting areas for hand counts to maximize the chance of detecting fraud, without actually recounting every single ballot. Can anyone comment on that?

Holts audit, audits every VVPB in a precinct, leaving no ballot behind.

These people see a problem with that, and offer a solution:
http://www.electiond...

Election defense alliance advocates taking a sample from all precincts, the thinking is that the audit will cover a larger jurisdiction, and thusly is better. Its not better, its different than Holts Audit. YOu see when you take a sample, you generally need to express the certainty that you are right by using a %. The Election defense alliance expresses the statistical certainty as 99%.

In a County level race, lets say Bob wins 50,003 to 49,997 votes. A Margin of 6 votes of 100,000 votes cast. But you see I hacked the voting machines, Bob really lost by 4 votes.

Would the Election defense alliance Audit find the 10 vote problem?

HInt 99% certainty leaves 1%. Whats 1% of 100,000 votes cast. Its very possible that the Election defense alliance audit would not find the hack I did. Because my hack falls with in the 1%.

If I hack one vote in Precinct 13y, and the Holt Audit is applied, the Holt audit is going to find that one vote hack, with 100% certainty.

Section 322 of HR 811, calls for a 10% Audit rate in a race that as close as 1% or less, if a race is 2% or closer the Audit rate is 3%.

I have been told that the Holt Audit at 10% of precincts is a fearsome tool that will find one vote that is out of place.

Impeach, Indict.


by: FogerRox @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 21:52:44 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
thank you for explaining that
It does seem like a "fearsome tool" indeed
 
by: Hopeful @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 23:46:24 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
A 10% audit rate is ROKKEN
2 years ago I would have never thought we could get 4 or 5%. SOme states were settling for 1%.... aRRGGggggg.

Section 322 calls for:

Race is close, by 1%, Audit 10% of Precincts

Between 1% and 2%, audit 5%

over 2% is a 3% audit

And Holt Audits the WHOLE DAMN PRECINCT, we are not dealing with a sample here, with 99% certainty, we are dealing with 100% certainty in a precinct.

Impeach, Indict.


by: FogerRox @ Sat Feb 10, 2007 at 00:48:59 AM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
Electoral Fraud is The Functional Equivalent of Terrorism
First, Congressman Holt, let me thank you for the leadership you have shown on this issue over the years.

On three separate occasions in the last year I have had the good fortune to be able to ask you questions and to even prod you on this issue and every time you have have been responsive and in an exceptionally courteous way.  That is appreciated.

Now that you have made these clarifications re this post I look forward to whatever feedback comes back from the nuts and bolts activists who are far more conversant than I am on the technical details. 

I trust you will, in due course, "iron out any wrinkles" that may arise throughout the coming hearings and that the Senate will not be permitted to water down (or pull the teeth out of) whatever emerges from the House.

As you know better than I; any loopholes WILL be exploited.

Now, to the heart of what I wish to say.

Back on September 20th 2001 President Bush addressed the nation through an extraordinary joint session of Congress and said (in reference to the perpetrators of the 9-11 attacks), "......They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other...."

Clearly, at that moment in time, Bush understood that the freedom to vote is the core sacrament of our democratic liturgy. 

He understood that any who would dare go beyond merely "hating" that freedom but who would dare to SUBVERT it, have committed an act of functional terrorism against our Constitution and our people.

There is no blood on the street when an election is stolen; but make no mistake...it is as much a stab at the very heart of our democratic freedoms and our American way of life as any bombing and should be treated as such.

When I briefly spoke to you at the election night celebration of Bob Menendez's victory; you were somewhat sympathetic to the idea of making the penalties for any would dare to even attempt to "screw around" with any election at any level draconian. 

At the time I recall I suggested that it be treated as a kind of treason and be punished by a period of imprisonment of 25 to life...and at the high end for a serious violation I only say life imprisonment because I am opposed to the desth penalty.

As you are well aware there have been many many many serious questions raised about the integrity of the outcomes of BOTH the 2000 and the 2004 residential elections.

How many thousands of people who are dead an broken today might be whole had either of those elections gone the other way? 

How many hundreds of billions of dollars might have been restored to constructive uses had either of those elections gone an other way? 

How much cleaner would our environment be had Al Gore been now serving in his second term?

We'll never know the answers to those questions.

Representative Holt; the penalties for violations of the law you are proposing MUST BE APPROPRIATE!!!

The words "harsh" and "draconian" generally have a negative connotation;  but in this instance they are appropriate.

We have already seen how the course of history itself can be changed when elections are insecure. 

We'll never know how much of the Bush/Rove strategy was influenced by the fact that so so so many people had no faith in the 2000 and 2004 elections. 

We need sanctions that are so strong that no one in their right mind would dare think of violating these laws. 

The people who would dare to commit the sacrilege  of directly subverting America's democracy deserve no pity.

Congressman Holt, I urge you to please consider making whatever modifications you can to put some razor sharp and unforgiving teeth in your legislation.

Thanks in Advance


by: Nick Lento @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 17:38:53 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
Nick you are on fire tonight... ! ! Well said.


Impeach, Indict.
 
by: FogerRox @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 21:07:03 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
Thank you Congressman Holt for stopping by.
Your reputation of accessibility precedes you.

I out was protesting the Iraq war here in Montclair, just got back home and I see by your answers I have not effectively voiced my concerns or the concerns I have read about on the email lists I subscribe to. Forgive me. I do hope, here,  to better clarify those concerns.

Congressman Holt wrote

First, the post states that my legislation does not require optical scan machines to produce a voter-verified paper ballot.

Roger wrote:

HR 811 has a specific opscanner exemption, no audit of paper

1) Congressman I think you missed the direction of stated concern. I understand that HR 811 labels Paper scanned ballots as VVPB. Thats good, very good. But does HR 811 mandate a VVPB audit for paper ballots scanned by optical scanners?

 

SEC. 2. PROMOTING ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY THROUGH VOTER-VERIFIED PERMANENT PAPER BALLOT.
(a)(1)(A)`(i) The voting system shall require the use of or produce an individual voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted. For purposes of this clause, examples of such a ballot include a paper ballot marked by the voter for the purpose of being counted by hand or read by an optical scanner...

I see inspection and verification. I don't see the word audit, I would offer this:
available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast, counted and audited as described in section 322.

Invoking the full weight of the improved "Holt Audit" for all VVPB's, as in section 322, leaves no wiggle room. I would prefer to see this in Section 2 clearly stated.

2)Washington attorney Paul Lehto who sued Sequoia, voiced his concern on the undisclosed software issue thusly.

. My take is that the attempt even to escrow the source code will also fail. Analysis on that below (that's separate from open source development)

The Holt bill, while seeming to have a very broad duty on the part of state and local government officials to "disclose" source code and object code (etc) to the federal government, has very weak langage on how the local or state government officials are going to get their paws on all this source code in all jurisdictions in the first place. The relevant text simply states that manufacturers shall provide the appropriate election official with the information necessary for the official to provide information to the Commission . It does not say "all" information, and it does not specify source code, just the amount of "information" necessary for the official to provide some "information" to the Commission.

If the source code is to be disclosed then that trade secret "property" is being lost because it will be disclosed (these trade secrets) to all the world via public request and therefore no longer a secret. So the claim will be made by the manufacturers that (A) because the law abhors a forfeiture, the language should not be interpreted to require them to "forfeit" millions in investment in their view via losing their source code in the first place, and alternatively (B) if the language IS sufficient to command a forefeiture of their trade secret property, then their trade secret "property" worth millions has been subject to a "regulatory taking" such that they should be compensated. Their investment, they will argue, has been nationalized in effect, and they should be compensated handsomely for that.

I will be very surprised if the states and locals get their hands on all source codes for free. Instead, it appears that the local officials obligations to disclose are so broad (they arguably even include the source code on firmware embedded on hardware that the vendors literally don't control) that the state and local officials will be making at least a partial defense of impossibility, and they will probably also add that it was impossible for them to get a hold of the source code from the vendor like Diebold or Sequoia, in addition to the firmware or what have you on all the other hardware parts.

Here again, you'd think Holt II was providing us with source code that would be open, but it is unlikely to happen that way. Sequoia filed a declaration in my case claiming their trade secret investment was around $6M without considering lost profits from their purported 'investment."

Note also that in section 12, the state and local officials are required to document the secure chain of custody of the trade secret software, among other things. While chain of custody is a good thing for the election, this also has the effect of forcing the local government to document that secrecy has been preserved as to the trade secret software, which is the primary argument to destroy a trade secret once it is admitted to exist. This helps make the trade secrecy claims of the vendor stronger as well when they sue for damages or an injunction to stop the disclosure of their trade secrets to anyone not under a confidentiality agreement with them.

------------------------------------------

Compare Section (9)'s broad language for local officials:

9) PROHIBITION OF USE OF UNDISCLOSED SOFTWARE IN VOTING SYSTEMS.-No voting system used in an election for Federal office shall at any time contain or use any software not certified by the State for use in the election or any software undisclosed to the State in the certification process. The appropriate election official shall disclose, in electronic form, the source code, object code, and executable representation of the voting system software and firmware to the Commission, including ballot programming files, and the Commission shall make that source code, object code, executable representation, and ballot programming files available for inspection promptly upon request to any person.

with section 12's weak language for vendors:

(i) The manufacturer and the election officials shall document the secure chain of custody for the handling of all software, hardware, vote storage media, and ballots used in connection with voting systems, and shall make the information available upon request to the Commission.

(ii) (ed. note: Only criminals not allowed in elections per this section are election, accounting, or computer security fraud criminals, but con men, national security felons, embezzlers and many others are very welcome).

(iii) The manufacturer shall provide the appropriate election official with the information necessary for the official to provide information to the Commission under paragraph (9).

Congressman on your 3rd point, please correct me if I am wrong. Since all DRE's would generate a VVPB, and opscan paper ballots are themselves VVPB. If a state holds a recount because of a close race, said recount will be counting said VVPB. Based on this sentence in Section 327:

.Nothing in the previous sentence may be construed to waive the application of any other provision of this Act to any election (including the ballot verification and audit capacity requirements of section 301(a)(2))
.
Am I citing the correct section in describing why no "close race" machine recount will be allowed under HR 811, that all "close race" recounts will be using VVPB as mandated by HR 811?

Previously I had just scanned this, but have now read this fully, sections 322 & 323 seem quite good, these sections are the "Guts" of the "Holt Audit", having a 10% audit rate in a close race is very powerful language. IIRC this is much stronger than HR 550. The "Holt Audit" is what garnered the term "The Gold standard". Now in HR 811 it might be the "Holt Audit" might be the "Gold Standard with decorative Platinum inlays and Diamonds".

After reading VVPB law from 13 states I get the feeling that parts of HR 811 are very well crafted, other parts are not, some are even vague and seem to be teeming with loopholes.

Impeach, Indict.


by: FogerRox @ Fri Feb 09, 2007 at 20:36:14 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
Black Box Voting. Org Offers 14 Reasons for Opposition to This Bill: (0.00 / 0)
1.  Deceptive Language.

2.  Billion Dollar Unfunded Mandate.
  (check www.bbvforums.org/forums.messages/1954/46649.html)

3.  Makes the Scandal Ridden EAC a Permanent Fixture & Increases Its Power.
  (check www.bradblog.com/?p=4119 for latest EAC scandal)

4.  Allows Loss of Secret Ballots for the Military.

5.  No Recognition of Citizen Right to Oversight.

6.  Conflicting Requirements, ie, must have text converters by 2008 and must
  study how to best do the conversions by 2010.

7.  Language on Disclosed Source Code Contains an Error, in that it doesn't
  deal with "COTS"... meaning any electronics component with a chip on it
  would be required to disclose source code.  There are literally hundreds
  of commercial off the shelf components in the system that contain 
  firmware, and these are manufactured all over the world.  The bill would
  require companies to open up their code for their commercial products
  if used in voting machines.  Effectively eliiminates the use of electronics
  while at the same time mandating electronics.

8.  "Mush" Language. (Example: "The manufacturer shall provide the
  appropriate election official with the information necessary for the official
  to provide the information....")

9.  Unreadable.  (No Appendix, so sections require the reader to actually go
  find a different bill and look up sections in order to make sense of the
  current bill.)

10. Audit Protocols No One Agrees With, (even fans of audit solutions).

11. Loophole Allowing Internet Connections for Central  Tabulators and Ballot
  Definition Software

12. Loophole Allowing Manual Audits to be Bypassed by States With
  Computer-Only Recount Protocols.

13. Loophole Allowing Machine Count to Supercede Voter Verified Paper
  When "Fuzzily" Described Circumstances Arise.  (ie: When there is a paper
  jam damaging the paper, machine count will trump.

14. Supports DRE's. (Touch-screens and other on-screen voting machine
  techniques that are NOT recommended by NIST).


by: krose @ Sun Feb 11, 2007 at 02:40:16 AM EST
[ Reply ]
 
 
krose, Votetrust is not against HR 811, correct?
Just want to get that straight.....

Impeach, Indict.
 
by: FogerRox @ Sun Feb 11, 2007 at 11:06:24 AM EST
 
[ Parent ]
 
 
Bev Harris of Black Box Voting (www.blackboxvoting.org)
says they ARE against the bill.  I do not know "directly" from Votetrust, but their regular newsletter usually comes out every Monday.  So, we should know for sure Tomorrow.
 
by: krose @ Sun Feb 11, 2007 at 15:12:50 PM EST
 
[ Parent ]
Rush Holt introduces replacement to HR 550, ... HR 811 | 20 comments | Post A Comment
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